I am not advocating some xenophobic, love-it-or-leave-it position. No
reasonable person expects immigrants to offer uncritical devotion or
unthinking commitment to Canada. But the idea that it is racist (or
fascist) at its deepest institutional or social levels, is, to be
deliberately understated, questionable. Hundreds of thousands of
immigrants arrive in Canada every year. Not all like it. But if so many
are as ill-disposed toward the country as Thobani and Roach imply, why
do so few leave?
The question underscores the issue I want to
consider today. Is it possible Thobani and Roach, and those who share
their views, are abusing the concept of tolerance?
n
In
yesterday's essay, I pointed out that toleration, traditionally
understood, reflects a willingness to acknowledge and respect the views
of others even if you disagree with them. Classical tolerance
demonstrates a kind of patience toward behaviour or ideas with which
you disagree. Voltaire, the 18th-century French philosopher,
encapsulated this understanding in a famous statement: "I disapprove of
what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."
What's
important to note about Voltaire's phrase is that toleration does not
presume agreement. Indeed, there has to be disagreement for tolerance
to be intelligible. If you agree with or support someone, you don't
need to be tolerant. As ethicists Brad Stetson and Joseph Conti
explain, toleration, rightly understood, involves "a difference of
opinion accompanied by a firm moral commitment to the decent treatment
of the person with whom one disagrees ... The concept of tolerance is
not relevant when there is no dispute or discontent about the way
things should go or the way they should be done. Toleration need only
be brought to bear when there is tension, where there is a disagreement
about what is fitting and proper whether the context be public or
private."
This understanding of toleration implies that
disapproval or even rejection of other views or ideas does not
necessarily constitute intolerance. I might disagree with someone's
religious beliefs, moral values or lifestyle choices, but I cannot be
accused of intolerance if I haven't expressed or acted upon my
disagreement in a way that is objectively harmful or threatening.
Philosopher Jay Newman captures this understanding of tolerance in
regard to differing religious beliefs: "Tolerating a religious belief
... does not involve a half-hearted acceptance or endurance of the
belief in itself, but rather it involves acceptance or endurance of
someone's holding that belief." Disapproval is not immoral.
Understood
this way, Stetson and Conti say, toleration constitutes an instance of
Aristotle's golden mean. Just as Aristotle regarded courage as midway
between fear and recklessness, so, too, is tolerance a virtue halfway
between excessive indulgence and a deficiency of empathy, or, to borrow
philosopher J. Budziszewski's phrasing, between "softheaded" or
"narrow-minded."
"Intolerance shows itself in two different ways,
for we can err in either of two different directions," says the
philosopher. "One way is by an excess of indulgence -- putting up with
something we should suppress (softheadedness) ... The other way that we
can err is by a deficiency of indulgence -- suppressing what we should
put up with (narrow-mindedness)." Someone who is genuinely tolerant --
that is, neither softheaded nor narrow-minded -- "will always be
somewhere between the two endpoints of (this) continuum, (his) location
depending on the act in question and on the circumstances."
n
Drawing
on Budziszewski's thought, it is easy to recognize the "intolerance" of
those who denounce anyone who questions the secularist abandonment of
traditional moral standards. To express doubts about the consequences
of unrestricted access to abortion, the legalization of drugs, the
soft-sell of euthanasia, same-sex marriage, open-door immigration or
social policies that arguably weaken the institution of the family;
such views are widely regarded as sexist, unprogressive, racist,
homophobic, anti-feminist, patriarchal, authoritarian, etc. by those
who regard themselves as gatekeepers of social wellness. But by
Budziszewski's criteria, it is often the "progressives" who show
intolerance in their hostility to any opposition to their views.
University student councils that refuse to allow anti-abortion
campaigners to freely express their views at on-campus forums are an
example of narrow-minded intolerance. So, too, are the Minneapolis taxi
drivers who claimed their religious freedom was being violated if they
could not refuse riders with dogs or carrying alcohol because such
things offended their Muslim faith.
Softheaded intolerance, on
the other hand, is evident in those who push liberalism to extremes
with notions of cultural relativism. According to the relativists, all
beliefs, lifestyle choices and moral values are equal. There is no
hierarchical standard of truth since all truths are relative, and no
point of view is more valid than any other. No one, according to this
softheaded view, has the right to judge the practices of another
culture as immoral or abhorrent. For example, journalist Andrea Park,
while hating the oppression of women in Muslim countries, felt she
could not judge the cultural practice of clitorectomies. "Is it
relevant that I, an outsider, may find the practice cruel? As hard as
it is for me to admit, the answer is no."
However, the
relativists are seldom as morally neutral or non-judgmental as they
require others to be. They may claim a willingness to hear other views,
and may say they endorse freedom of speech, but they are terribly
offended when someone questions their view of the world. Indeed, for
such progressives, the claim of tolerance "becomes code for 'shut up
and don't critique,'" as commentator Justin Taylor puts it.
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